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Abstract Conventional understanding distinguishes between criminal law (and
procedures) and civil law (and procedures). These distinctions often rest upon
differences as to the moving party, the culpability of a wrongdoer, the nature of
a wrong, the remedy available, etc. to determine whether a particular action
ought to fall upon the civil or the criminal side of the paradigmatic divide. These
distinctions, however, prove problematic in relation to hybrid systems of
justice, given legislative attempts to pursue criminal law objectives using civil
processes. Using the non-conviction-based asset forfeiture model adopted in
Ireland, and drawing upon the test adopted by the US Supreme Court as to what
distinguishes the civil from the criminal, this article examines how the Irish
judiciary has responded to this approach, ultimately contending that the courts
have failed to provide a check against the legislature circumventing enhanced
procedural protections of the criminal process and imposing punishment in the
civil forum. The article concludes by asking whether a hybrid, or middle-
ground, process, in which some enhanced procedural protections are afforded
to a person confronted with punitive civil sanctions, offers an alternative to the
rigid confines of the conventional civil/criminal dichotomy.
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he dichotomy between civil and criminal matters is long since estab-
lished. In Atcheson v Everitt, Lord Mansfield stated: ‘Now there is no
distinction better known, than the distinction between civil and
criminal law; or between criminal prosecutions and civil actions’.1 This
distinction is often said to rest on a number of key differences between the two
paradigms,2 namely: (1) Criminal liability can only be imposed where the
wrongdoer is subjectively culpable,3 whereas liability can be imposed in civil
actions where it is shown that the wrongdoer was objectively culpable.4 (2) The
role of a prosecution authority acting on behalf of the State is generally seen as
indicative of a criminal matter.5 Since criminal offences are regarded as matters of
public concern,6 criminal proceedings are usually instigated by the State (or its
representatives) on behalf of the public at large. Civil proceedings, in contrast, are
generally taken by private individuals, with the public interest in the act being
merely incidental. (3) As civil matters are concerned with individual interests,
they (usually) require actual damage to a specific individual before liability may be
imposed. (4) There are a number of powers afforded to State authorities in
criminal matters that are not usually available in civil proceedings. For example,
powers of arrest, detention, entry, search and seizure, to name but a few, are
generally associated with investigations into criminal activity.7 (5) These intrusive
investigatory powers are balanced by rules of evidence, at the trial stage, which are
much more restrictive in criminal proceedings than their civil counterparts.8 The
paradigmatic divide, then, is reflected in, inter alia, the different rules of
procedure, burdens of proof, rules of discovery, investigatory practices and modes
of punishment.9 (6) Criminal law achieves its aim by means of punishment (or
threatened punishment) of offenders (or potential offenders). Civil law, in
contrast, has as its purpose the restitution or compensation of a wronged party. As
Holdsworth points out, ‘a suit by a private person sounds in damages, whereas a
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suit by the king ends in the punishment of the guilty party’.10 (7) An adverse civil
judgment does not carry the same social condemnation as does a criminal
conviction. As Stephen notes, the criminal law ‘proceeds upon the principle that it
is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by
inflicting upon criminals punishments which express it’.11 For Hart, the stigma
attached to a criminal conviction is what distinguishes a person who has been
committed to a mental institution from the convict sentenced to a penal insti-
tution. Only the convict will experience ‘the moral condemnation of his
community’.12
Recent decades, however, have witnessed many jurisdictions, across the world,
seeking to pursue criminal law objectives in the civil realm through, for example,
the use of anti-social behaviour orders, serious crime prevention orders and
control orders to tackle low-level criminality and anti-social behaviour, serious
crime, and terrorism, respectively. The adoption of civil processes for crime-
control strategies is strikingly illustrated by contemporary non-conviction-based
asset forfeiture (or civil forfeiture) legislation, where an ‘accused’, facing the
prospect of being deprived of assets on the grounds that they constitute proceeds
of crime, will have to demonstrate to the court that this is not so. Failure to do so
could see those assets being forfeited to the State. This innovative procedure is
welcomed by law enforcement agencies on the grounds that it is much more
efficient and expedient than conventional (and more cumbersome) criminal
procedure.13 Critics, however, have been vociferous in proclaiming that a
non-conviction-based approach allows the State to circumvent traditional
safeguards of the criminal process.
While the debate as to due process implications of the non-conviction-based
approach has been ongoing for quite some time, there is another persistent
question regarding the use of civil remedies in pursuit of criminal law objectives,
namely what constitutional limits constrain their use?14 This article critically
appraises how the Irish model of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture has
withstood constitutional scrutiny, arguing that the Irish courts have failed to look
beyond the ‘civil’ label, thereby prioritising the legislative label over the actual
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13 A. Kennedy, ‘Justifying the Civil Recovery of Criminal Proceeds’ (2004) 12(1) Journal of Financial Crime
8; T. P. Farley, ‘Asset Forfeiture Reform: A Law Enforcement Response’ (1994) 39 New York Law
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14 M. M. Cheh, ‘Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal–Civil Law Distinction’ (1991) 42(5) Hastings LJ
1325.
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substance of the Proceeds of Crime Acts 1996–2005 and thus facilitating the use of
civil processes as a crime-control strategy. Indeed, the imposition of civil sanctions
that are functionally equivalent to the criminal sanction undermines the exclu-
sivity of the criminal sanction.15
The Irish regime offers a wealth of information for policymakers, practitioners
and scholars alike. Yet, while there has been discussion of the adoption of the
non-conviction-based approach, as well as theoretical and comparative exami-
nation of the Irish model of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture,16 analysis of
the Irish model remains relatively underdeveloped.17 This article aims to take
one step in furthering knowledge of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture by
focusing on how the Irish judiciary have responded to this radical new weapon
in the armoury of the State.18 It will be demonstrated that the
non-conviction-based approach allows the State to pursue criminal law objec-
tives in the civil realm, absent enhanced procedural protections of the criminal
process. The Irish model is deliberately chosen here for the following reasons:
first, the Irish adoption of a non-conviction-based asset forfeiture model in 1996
shone a beacon which a number of other common law jurisdictions have since
followed.19 Secondly, in the 15 years that this model has been in force it has been
conclusively ruled that the legislation passes constitutional muster and does not
require enhanced procedural protections of the criminal process as the scheme
falls on the civil side of the paradigmatic divide. Thirdly, given that the UK
Supreme Court20 has recently delivered judgment on the civil nature of
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Financial Crime 132.
20 Gale v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011] UKSC 49.
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non-conviction-based asset forfeiture, the time is opportune to consider how this
issue has been approached in a neighbouring jurisdiction. Non-conviction-based
asset forfeiture has also been subject to scrutiny by the Canadian Supreme Court
as recently as 2009,21 while in the United States the National Institute of Justice
has initiated a review of unexplained wealth legislation, drawing upon Irish
experiences as one example of international best practice. The fourth, and
perhaps the most pressing, reason why focus is centred on the Irish approach
stems from concern relating to cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices
(AROs) of EU Member States.22 A number of jurisdictions have expressed concern
as to the non-conviction-based approach which, in turn, has impacted upon
recognition of orders in countries where such a regime does not operate. The
Criminal Assets Bureau (as the designated Irish ARO) is playing a key role in
attempting to allay such concern through, for example, delivering presentations
demonstrating how the Irish model has withstood constitutional scrutiny at the
domestic level and how this fits in with rights under the European Convention
on Human Rights. The Bureau also provides support at the European level in
seeking to achieve recognition of non-conviction-based orders in appropriate
cases.23 A fifth, and related, reason is that there are increasing calls for the EU to
adopt a non-conviction-based regime,24 based on the successes of the Irish model.
Given these developments the approach of the Irish judiciary, in upholding the
constitutionality of the Proceeds of Crime Acts, merits scrutiny. This article
argues that the Irish judiciary has been overly deferential (acquiescent even) to
the legislative intent. Admittedly this does appear to accord with the separation
of powers, yet it is to be expected that the courts will put a check on any attempt
by the legislature to exceed its authority. It will, however, be demonstrated that,
at least insofar as non-conviction-based asset forfeiture is concerned, the courts
have failed to stand up to the legislature. Instead, the courts have focused on the
form of the relevant statutory provisions, rather than their substance, giving the
State free rein to pursue criminal law objectives under the guise of a civil
process. Indeed, it has been said that a markedly consequentialist thinking
permeates judicial debate on non-conviction-based asset forfeiture, which
stresses the substantial detriment to forfeiture proceedings if due process norms
were to be insisted upon.25 Given this, it might be argued that a hybrid, or
middle-ground, approach presents a viable alternative approach. Under a
middle-ground system of justice, some (but not all) enhanced protections would
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be afforded where a person is confronted with punitive civil sanctions.26 There
are difficulties with such an approach, however, not least in determining what
enhanced protections ought to apply and in what circumstances.
Non-conviction-based asset forfeiture, due process concerns and punitive
civil sanctions
The Proceeds of Crime Act is concerned with property that constitutes, directly or
indirectly, proceeds of crime. Significantly, the procedure set down in the Act
operates outside the conventional criminal justice system. There is no require-
ment that a person be convicted of a criminal offence before action may be taken
under the Act. Indeed, it is not even necessary that criminal proceedings be insti-
tuted against a person. The Proceeds of Crime Act operates in the civil sphere. Yet,
it would not be appropriate to describe proceedings under the Act as private
litigation. It is, in fact, the use of public law powers, by the State, in the civil
courts.27 This Act allows the court, prior to the trial of an action, to restrain a
person from dealing with assets where the court is satisfied that those assets
represent proceeds of crime and are of a certain value. As Finnegan J noted in
McKenna v EH, the Act of 1996 ‘creates a statutory right to an injunction to preserve
the assets said to be the proceeds of crime’.28 Ultimately, a person might be
deprived of any rights in the property concerned. The underlying rationale here
can be traced to concern surrounding organised crime-type activities.29
‘Following-the-money’ trail, and especially non-conviction-based asset forfeiture,
is seen as a central aspect of contemporary measures designed to hit back at those
at the upper echelons of crime groups. Often, these people are seen as being
beyond the reach of conventional criminal procedures.30 Non-conviction-based
asset forfeiture, then, offers an alternative method of bringing these people to
‘justice’.
Non-conviction-based asset forfeiture, however, raises serious concerns about
circumventing traditional due process protections that are inherent in the
criminal process. Lea, for example, has described the non-conviction-based
approach as ‘a frontal assault on due process’.31 It has been said that the Criminal
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28 [2002] 1 IR 72 at 81.
29 Meade, above n. 16.
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Assets Bureau and the Irish model of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture
together ‘indicate a realignment of the approach adopted by the agents of the
State in the fight against organised crime, and demonstrate a preference for the
needs of the State over the individual’s right to due process’.32 Further,
it is significantly easier to prove matters of fact and law to the civil
standard of a balance of probabilities than it is to prove the same
beyond a reasonable doubt. Even a modest degree of civil content
introduced into the strategy, the trading of the criminal standard for
the civil standard of proof in the confiscation process, facilitates the
task of realizing an attack on the financial elements of crime.33
Such a radical approach, in which crime-control objectives are pursued using civil
processes, has been justified on grounds of inadequacies of the conventional
criminal justice approach and in the interests of efficiency and expediency. Yet this
‘fails to address why some unknown amount of economic savings should relieve the
state of the duty to afford EPP [i.e. enhanced procedural protections] to defendants
before forcing them into a position of serving as a negative example or of suffering
punishment to deter one’s own speculative future misbehaviour without an offer of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and other EPP’.34 It is this bone of contention that
causes so much difficulty—a person can be subjected to what is, arguably, a criminal
punishment but is stripped of important due process protections. Given this, an
alternative approach has been suggested, one in which some enhanced procedural
protections are afforded to a person when faced with punitive civil sanctions. Before
examining whether such a middle-ground system would be appropriate for
non-conviction-based asset forfeiture, we first consider how the Irish courts have
responded to the non-conviction-based approach, and how this approach has proved
problematic for the conventional civil/criminal dichotomy.
Judicial reaction to non-conviction-based asset forfeiture in Ireland
The seminal decision on the Proceeds of Crime Act in Ireland was delivered by the
Supreme Court in Murphy v GM, PB, PC Ltd, GH; Gilligan v CAB.35 In that case, it was
argued that the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act essentially formed part of
the criminal law, not the civil law, and that persons affected by these provisions
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were deprived of important safeguards inherent in criminal procedure. Specifi-
cally, it was contended that the presumption of innocence was reversed, the
standard of proof was on the balance of probabilities rather than beyond
reasonable doubt, there was no provision for trial by jury, and the rule against
double jeopardy was ignored. It was submitted that features of the Act were indic-
ative of its criminal nature, namely:
1. it was of general application;
2. it made no provision for compensation or reparation to victims of
alleged crimes;
3. its clear policy was the deterrence of crime;
4. relief under the Act could only be obtained where the assets were
shown to be the proceeds of crime;
5. there was an implicit necessity for mens rea;
6. the applicant was a senior Garda officer attached to the Criminal Assets
Bureau; and
7. powers exclusively associated with the criminal law (for example,
search warrants) were used to assist the plaintiff’s case.
The appellants relied on the decision in Melling v O’Mathghamhna36 in support of
their contention that the procedure is essentially criminal in nature rather than
civil. They also relied on a number of decisions from the United States in support
of their contention.37
Keane CJ, delivering the sole judgment of the court, found that, although the legis-
lation was unquestionably draconian, it was compatible with the Constitution. The
issue to be resolved was whether proceedings under the Act were civil or criminal
in nature, and the court came down in favour of the former. If the court was of the
opinion that the civil forfeiture scheme was of a criminal nature, the Act would
not survive constitutional scrutiny. As Keane CJ stated:
It is almost beyond argument that, if the procedures under ss.2, 3 and
4 of the Act of 1996 constituted in substance, albeit not in form, the
trial of persons on criminal charges, they would be invalid having
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regard to the provisions of the Constitution. The virtual absence of the
presumption of innocence, the provision that the standard of proof is
to be on the balance of probabilities and the admissibility of hearsay
evidence taken together are inconsistent with the requirement in
Article 38.1 of the Constitution that ‘No person shall be tried on any
criminal charge save in due course of law.’
It is also clear that, if these procedures constitute the trial of a person
on a criminal charge, which, depending on the value of the property,
might or might not constitute a minor offence, the absence of any
provision for a trial by jury of such a charge in the Act would clearly be
in violation of Article 38.5 of the Constitution.38
After a review of the case law, Keane CJ found that the indicia of crime set out in
Melling are not present in the Act of 1996:
In contrast, in proceedings under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act of 1996, there is
no provision for the arrest or detention of any person, for the
admission of persons to bail, for the imprisonment of a person in
default of payment of a penalty, for a form of criminal trial initiated
by summons or indictment, for the recording of a conviction in any
form or for the entering of a nolle prosequi at any stage.39
The Supreme Court, however, was more concerned with form rather than
substance. But, as Warren CJ exclaimed in the US case of Trop v Dulles, ‘How simple
would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific
problems could be solved by inspection of the labels posted on them!’40 Rather, we
must look beyond the face of the legislation to consider whether the provisions of
the Act are, de facto, concerned with criminal, as opposed to civil, matters.41 A
useful comparator here can be found in the test currently favoured by the
Supreme Court in the United States.42 The US test is deliberately chosen here given
that:
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1. the US courts have struggled with the civil/criminal dichotomy for a
considerable length of time;43
2. the United States briefly flirted with the idea of a hybrid system of
justice;44 and
3. the United States is the leading jurisdiction in terms of a non-
conviction-based approach to seizing criminal assets.
The first stage of the US test is to consider whether the proceedings were intended
to be civil or otherwise. If they were intended to be civil proceedings, the second
stage is to consider whether their purpose was so punitive as to override that
intent.45 Applying this test to the Irish model of non-conviction-based asset
forfeiture allows us to examine not only what the legislature intended to create,
but also that which was actually created. This goes to the heart of the contention
that, in giving judicial imprimatur to the Proceeds of Crime Acts, the Irish
judiciary were more concerned with form rather than substance.
Applying the US test to the Irish schema
Stage One—the legislative intent
The Proceeds of Crime Act was clearly intended to be a matter of civil proceedings.
Section 8(2) expressly provides that the relevant standard of proof is that appli-
cable to civil proceedings. Moreover, as can be seen from GM/Gilligan, the 1996 Act
does not have the hallmarks of criminal proceedings. There is no question of
arrest, detention, search, or being brought before a court in custody. A person
facing proceedings under this legislation is not liable to prosecution with the
potential for punishment following conviction. The language of the criminal law
is not to be found in the legislation. The Act makes no use of such terms as
‘offence’, ‘prosecution’, or ‘conviction’; such terms would traditionally be seen as
associated with criminal proceedings. Instead, the Act refers to the ‘applicant’ and
‘respondent’, terms more closely associated with civil proceedings. Furthermore,
the Act makes provision for proceedings to be held otherwise than in public,
something which is foreign to criminal proceedings. Insofar as the Irish courts
considered the legislative intent behind the Proceeds of Crime Act, they correctly
held that the Oireachtas intended to create a civil procedure.46 That, however, is not
determinative. While the Oireachtas may have intended to create a civil procedure,
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we must consider what was actually created—intention does not necessarily
dictate substance.
In fact, if we look more closely, we see that officers of the Criminal Assets Bureau
are able to draw upon significant powers (including powers of entry, search and
seizure) that traditionally come within the ambit of the police force. While such
powers are commonly associated with the criminal process, the Bureau is able to
utilise them in a civil setting to pursue criminal law objectives. Moreover, Bureau
officers retain their powers and duties vested in them as a member of An Garda
Síochána (Irish police), an officer of the Revenue Commissioners, or an officer of
the Minister for Social Protection, as the case may be.47 As such, it would not be
unusual to see criminal law powers being utilised in pursuit of the functions and
objectives of the Bureau, which include the identification of assets that derive, or
are suspected to derive, from criminal conduct and the taking of appropriate
action to deprive persons of the benefit of such assets.48 One example of criminal
law powers being deployed within the confiscation regime is the use of opinion
evidence,49 which has traditionally been reserved for prosecuting terrorist
offences and, more recently, organised crime-type activities.50 Furthermore, while
the Proceeds of Crime Act itself is not concerned with obtaining criminal
conviction, nor does it contain the language of the criminal law (insofar as the
term ‘proceeds of crime’ can be said to be concerned with non-criminal matters),
the reality of the situation is that the Criminal Assets Bureau does, in fact, use the
proceeds of crime legislation to target people with criminal convictions, particu-
larly those with convictions for organised crime style activities. The judiciary,
however, have failed to provide a check against encroachment of civil processes
upon the criminal realm. Commenting on a similarly permissive approach
adopted by the US Supreme Court, Charney opines:
This deference to legislative history in determining whether a
sanction or a statute is criminal or civil is a gross abdication of the
judicial role. Although such an approach appears to be an
enlightened attempt to carry out congressional purpose through
statutory interpretation, it avoids the substantive question of
whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority. No
amount of congressional labelling should determine that question.
When constitutional safeguards are involved, it is the function of the
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courts ultimately to decide whether and under what circumstances
these protections apply.51
Stage Two—a punitive purpose?
Looking beyond the form of the legislation, jurisprudence from the United States52
and Strasbourg53 are useful in considering the substance of the Proceeds of Crime
Act. At this point, it is worth setting out the multi-factor test enunciated by the US
Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez:54
1. whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
2. whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
3. whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
4. whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment—retribution and deterrence,
5. whether the behaviour to which it applies is already a crime,
6. whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and
7. whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.
(1) An affirmative disability or restraint?
It would certainly appear that non-conviction-based asset forfeiture involves an
affirmative disability or restraint. A person may have his use of property
restrained, and ultimately forfeited, under the 1996 Act. It would therefore seem
that the first limb of the Mendoza-Martinez test is satisfied. As Campbell points out,
‘Although the effect of the measure on the individual is not decisive in deter-
mining whether it is criminal or civil, the imposition of a disability or restraint is
nevertheless an important factor when taken in conjunction with other elements
which may indicate that the forfeiture process is criminal rather than civil’.55
(2) Historically regarded as punishment?
The next factor to consider is whether forfeiture has, historically, been regarded
as a punishment. The leading Irish jurisprudence in this area can be found
in Attorney-General v Southern Industrial Trust Ltd56 and Clancy v Ireland,57 which
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demonstrate that forfeiture has traditionally been seen as a civil, and not a
criminal, matter. It might well be argued, however, that the Proceeds of Crime
Acts 1996 and 2005 are sui generis and are not, therefore, comparable to legislation
that was in issue in Southern Industrial Trust Ltd and Clancy. While jurisprudence on
forfeiture powers often regards such powers as being remedial in nature, it might
be contended that the 1996 Act is, in contrast, of a punitive nature. On the other
hand, powers of civil forfeiture have often been justified on the grounds that,
although there might well be a hint of punitiveness, the public interest in
ensuring that crime does not pay ought to prevail.58 The proceeds of crime legis-
lation is, however, utilised by the Criminal Assets Bureau to tackle particular
forms of criminality, particularly that associated with organised crime, and, as
such, it is certainly arguable that it ought to fall within the criminal paradigm.
Before leaving this strand of the multi-factor test, it is worth briefly turning to the
approach in the United States where the Supreme Court, in US v Ursery, has
referred to ‘our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute
punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause’.59 The US juris-
prudence on this matter, though, is complicated by the earlier decision in Austin v
US60 where it was held that forfeiture was, historically, regarded, at least in part, as
punishment. Austin, however, was distinguished as the court was there concerned
with the prohibition against excessive fines, whereas in Ursery the court was
dealing with double jeopardy principles. This, however, is a very flimsy
distinction. Indeed, as Stevens J, dissenting, noted, ‘punishment’ is ‘a concept that
plays a central role in the jurisprudence of both the Excessive Fines Clause and the
Double Jeopardy Clause’.61 He goes on to state, ‘it would make little sense to say
that forfeiture might be punishment “for the purposes of” the Excessive Fines
Clause but not the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is difficult to imagine why the
Framers of the two Amendments would have required a particular sanction not to
be excessive, but would have allowed it to be imposed multiple times for the same
offence.’62
(3) The presence of scienter?
It might well be argued that the scienter requirement is satisfied given that the
alleged criminal conduct of the respondent will be at the heart of the proceedings.
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In fact, given that the Criminal Assets Bureau utilises powers under the Proceeds
of Crime Act to target people with criminal convictions, particularly those
associated with organised crime-type activities, is there not an implicit
requirement of scienter? The courts do not think so. This matter was considered by
the High Court in the GM case, where O’Higgins J stated: ‘It is not necessary for the
operation of an Order made under the Proceeds of Crime Act that the Respondent
be guilty of any crime, nor is it necessary that their conduct be morally reprehen-
sible. It is quite conceivable that an Order could be made against a guiltless person
who has possession of goods which are the proceeds of crime’.63 He went on to say:
‘No question of mens rea or fraud necessarily arises in the Proceeds of Crime Act. It
may arise in many cases but it is not necessary. I cannot accept the contention that
the “save for the injustice” clause imports mens rea into the Act’.64 All that is
required is that the court be satisfied that the property concerned represents
proceeds of crime, that is ‘any property obtained or received at any time … by or as
a result of or in connection with criminal conduct’.65 This, however, does not
require that an offence has been committed by the respondent.
Even where it is established that a party had committed a criminal offence, that
does not render the proceedings criminal proceedings.66 Proceedings under the
Act are in rem, rather than in personam, hence forfeiture may be granted even
where the person in possession of the property concerned is entirely blameless.67
This would appear to favour the contention that there is no scienter requirement
under the Proceeds of Crime Act. The in rem/in personam distinction is, however,
grounded upon the legal fiction that it is the rem, the property itself, that is guilty,
not the person in possession of that property.68 But as Gallant points out: ‘It is of
course entirely artificial to say that the property is “at fault”. Property has no
ability to act on its own; it is controlled or used by an individual’.69 In a scathing
comment, denouncing the in rem/in personam fiction relied upon in the Ursery
case,70 Fellmeth states: ‘The Court apparently felt that Congress intended not to
punish or deter the drug dealer, but rather to teach the house a lesson by trans-
ferring its ownership to someone less desirable. That the highest court in the land
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could adopt such specious reasoning is perplexing’.71 Moreover, the (rather tautol-
ogous) justification here is that by proceeding against the property concerned, the
owner is not punished; the owner is not punished as the proceedings are taken
against the guilty property.
(4) The traditional aims of punishment
While it has been suggested elsewhere that the non-conviction-based approach
‘promotes punishment’s traditional aims of condemnation, retribution and deter-
rence, and so should be viewed as a criminal process’,72 this section adopts a
different perspective as to whether the traditional aims of punishment ought to
be afforded such a prominent role. The value of this limb is, it is suggested,
dubious. Traditionally, criminal law was said to serve retributive and/or deterrent
purposes while civil law was seen as serving restitutionary and/or compensatory
purposes. This, however, no longer holds true. Civil proceedings might well result
in the infliction of punishment, thus the presence of punishment is not neces-
sarily determinative. Moreover, the presence of retributive or deterrent purposes
offers little by way of support. It cannot be said that criminal proceedings serve
solely a retributive or deterrent purpose. Furthermore, civil sanctions might also
pursue retributive or deterrent objectives. It is submitted that this limb of the
Mendoza-Martinez test offers little as a distinguishing factor between the civil and
criminal paradigms.73 Nonetheless, discussion of this limb does serve a useful
purpose in allowing a greater understanding of the purposes of the Proceeds of
Crime legislation.
The Irish criminal justice system has, since the 1990s, witnessed significant
recalibration. Legislation has been introduced to target those at the upper
echelons of organised criminal activity. One such piece of legislation is the
Proceeds of Crime Act, designed to separate criminals from their ill-gotten gains,
enacted shortly after the murders of Detective Garda Jerry McCabe and the investi-
gative journalist Veronica Guerin. These murders were said to ‘represent a
defining moment in the battle against subversion and organised crime’.74 The
adoption of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture was seen as a means of hitting
back at criminality, and the underlying punitive feeling is clear to see. In addition,
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the confiscation of assets would, so it was assumed, act as a deterrent in that it
would eliminate the incentive to commit crime and also remove the capital for
future criminal activity.75 It has been recognised that the ‘proceeds of crime legis-
lation and the continued and successful efforts of the Criminal Assets Bureau have
been of huge significance in the fight against crime’.76 As Pollock notes:
The expansion of civil forfeiture is enabling the government to
achieve crime enforcement goals both effectively and efficiently.
Through confiscation of property connected to illegal activity, the
government is able to deter and sanction criminal activity by
increasing the economic cost of engaging in such activity.77
Deprivation of assets might also be said to affect both a respondent and his family,
thereby potentially acting as a further deterrent.78 It must, however, be acknowl-
edged that:
While a large body of literature exists regarding the legal issues
surrounding forfeiture, little material exists respecting forfeiture’s
effectiveness in deterring crime. This dearth of research is bewil-
dering in light of the frequency with which the effectiveness of
forfeiture is cited in justification of its employment.79
Furthermore, it is almost inevitable that a person confronted with proceedings
under the Act will experience some form of social stigma.80 From this perspective,
then, it would certainly appear that the Proceeds of Crime Act would satisfy this
limb of the Mendoza-Martinez multi-factor test in that it does concern itself with
traditional aims of punishment.
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On the other hand, it might also be suggested that the Act serves a reparative or
regulatory function.81 Thus, in Gilligan v CAB, McGuinness J, while recognising that
the Act provides ‘a method of attacking a certain form of criminality’, went on to
say that removal of the proceeds of crime ‘could well be viewed in the light of
reparation rather than punishment or penalty’.82 Significantly, the Act does not
make provision for the imprisonment of a party facing proceedings there-
under which would prima facie indicate that it is not concerned with criminal
punishment. While incarceration is not exclusive to the criminal paradigm,83 it is
generally indicative of the criminal law at work. The absence of imprisonment as a
sanction is highly significant in support of the argument that the Proceeds of
Crime Act does not fall within the criminal side of the divide.84 In M v D, Moriarty J
expressed the view that the Act was designed ‘not to achieve penal sanctions, but
to effectively deprive [the principals of professional crime] of such illicit fruits of their
labours as can be shown to be proceeds of crime’.85 In the case of US v Ursery, the US
Supreme Court expressed the view that civil forfeiture does not constitute
punishment. The court recognised that the provisions in question ‘while perhaps
having certain punitive aspects, serve important non-punitive goals’.86
Just because civil forfeiture might be said to serve non-punitive goals, that does
not prevent it from also having a punitive function. With respect, it would appear
illogical to suggest that measures designed to deprive criminals of their ill-gotten
gains do not also impose a penal sanction. Where a person is suspected of
involvement in criminal activity, and it is sought to, essentially, impose
punishment on that person (in the pursuit of criminal law objectives), then surely
any such punishment must serve punitive purposes. In truth, is there any real
distinction to be drawn between a person deprived of property under proceeds of
crime legislation on the basis that he has acquired such property from illegal
activity and another person subjected to an equivalent criminal fine for his illegal
activity?87 Or are we to accept that deprivation of assets is simply a form of
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punishment inflicted upon the property itself, rather than the person in
possession or control of that property? Does such deprivation teach the property a
lesson?
While there are, therefore, strong arguments both in favour of and against the
contention that non-conviction-based asset forfeiture serves the traditional aims
of punishment, it must be reiterated, however, that this limb of the multi-factor
test is of limited value as the traditional aims of punishment, namely retribution
and deterrence, do not easily align themselves within the paradigmatic divide
between the civil and the criminal.
(5) Whether that behaviour is already a crime
The fifth limb of the test asks whether the behaviour with which the proceedings
are concerned is already a crime. Before proceeding further, it is worth reiterating
that proceedings seeking the civil forfeiture of assets do not require a criminal
conviction. Indeed, an entirely blameless party may suffer the loss of property
where the court is satisfied that that property represents proceeds of crime. The
Act is based on the legal fiction that it is the property that is guilty, not the person
in possession. Looking to the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ we see that this
refers to ‘any property obtained or received at any time … by or as a result of or in
connection with criminal conduct’.88 While it need not be established that specific
property is derived from a specific instance of criminal conduct, the courts must
be satisfied that property is derived from criminal conduct. This is particularly
important given that, in practice, the Criminal Assets Bureau relies on the
Proceeds of Crime Act to target those suspected of, and/or convicted of, criminal
activity, particularly that activity associated with organised crime. While a
criminal conviction is not required for a person to be deprived of property under
the Proceeds of Crime Act, it would appear that, de facto, the Bureau uses powers
under the Act to target wrongdoers, to impose criminal punishment in the civil
process.
(6) and (7) Alternative purpose and excessiveness in relation to its pursuit
Finally, we must consider whether the Proceeds of Crime Act serves an alternative
purpose and, if so, whether that sanction appears excessive in relation to that
alternative purpose (the sixth and seventh limbs of the multi-factor test). It is
axiomatic that the confiscation of ill-gotten assets does serve non-punitive goals,
for example it serves preventive and reparative purposes. As McGuinness J
emphasised in Gilligan:
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By divesting major criminals of their ill-gotten gains, they [i.e. the
police] hope to reduce their power and influence and to render them
more vulnerable to arrest, trial and conviction. ... if this money or
property can be shown to the satisfaction of the court to be the
proceeds of crime, its removal could well be viewed in the light of
reparation rather than punishment or penalty.89
Just because it does serve alternative purposes, though, does not mean that it
cannot also have a punitive element. In Welch v United Kingdom, the Strasbourg
Court noted the preventive purpose of confiscating property, but went on to say:
it cannot be excluded that legislation which confers such broad
powers of confiscation on the courts also pursues the aim of
punishing the offender. Indeed the aims of prevention and reparation
are consistent with a punitive purpose and may be seen as constituent
elements of the very notion of punishment.90
Significantly, the procedure in question in Welch, namely the (UK) Drug
Trafficking Offences Act 1986, required a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to
confiscation and is, thus, distinguishable from the civil procedure under the
Proceeds of Crime Act. Moreover, in Welch, the court limited its decision to the
question of retrospective punishment, so that it ‘does not call into question in any
respect the powers of confiscation conferred on the courts as a weapon in the fight
against the scourge of drug trafficking’.91 With criminal forfeiture, though, a
person facing deprivation of property is accorded all the enhanced procedural
protections of the criminal process. While his property might be seized—as a
preventive measure—with an eye on ultimate forfeiture to the State, such
forfeiture cannot occur until it is established, beyond reasonable doubt, that that
person is guilty of an offence.
Under the Irish Proceeds of Crime Act the forfeiture of assets occurs in the civil
process, so that a person can be ‘punished’, by the deprivation of assets, simply for
being in possession of property suspected of constituting proceeds of crime. The
Strasbourg Court has, however, recognised that the confiscation of assets, under
relevant Italian legislation, ‘pursued an aim that was in the general interest,
namely it sought to ensure that the use of the property in question did not procure
for the applicant, or the criminal organisation to which he was suspected of
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belonging, advantages to the detriment of the community’.92 The court went on to
say that confiscation ‘is an effective and necessary weapon in the combat against
this cancer [i.e. the unlawful activities of the Mafia, in particular drug trafficking].
It therefore appears proportionate to the aim pursued, all the more so because it
in fact entails no additional restriction in relation to seizure’.93
Is the use of the civil process, with its reduced safeguards, proportionate to the
purposes for which the legislation was enacted? The question of proportionality
can clearly be seen in the context of property rights. In Chestvale Properties Ltd v
Glackin, concerning the power of a company inspector to compel production of
documents, Murphy J accepted that the legislation in question did impinge, to an
extent, on the property rights of the applicants. But, he went on to say, this was ‘a
marginal erosion of or interference with incorporeal property rights’.94 The
intrusion upon the applicant’s property rights had to be balanced against the
public interest to have an inspector investigate and report on the membership of a
particular company.95 Similarly, in M v D, where powers of discovery under s. 9 of
the Proceeds of Crime Act were at issue, Moriarty J abruptly dismissed the
contention that s. 9 infringed the provisions of Article 40.3 of the Constitution.
… whilst it may be said that s. 9 does to some extent erode or interfere
with property rights, this erosion must be balanced against the public
interest inherent in the section, so that no unjust attack on property
rights is in fact disclosed.96
Clearly, public interest arguments weigh heavily in the mind of the courts. This
is particularly evident in the following passage delivered by McGuinness J in
Gilligan:
While the provisions of the Act may, indeed, affect the property rights
of a respondent it does not appear to this court that they constitute an
‘unjust attack’ under Article 40.3.2, given the fact that the State must
in the first place show to the satisfaction of the court that the property
in question is the proceeds of crime and that thus, prima facie, the
respondent has no good title to it, and also given the balancing provi-
sions built into ss.3 and 4 [of the Act].
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This court would also accept that the exigencies of the common good
would certainly include measures designed to prevent the accumu-
lation and use of assets which directly or indirectly derive from
criminal activities. The right to private ownership cannot hold a place
so high in the hierarchy of rights that it protects the position of assets
illegally acquired and held.97
This is particularly problematic when we consider that an entirely blameless party
may be relieved of his assets on the grounds that they represent proceeds of crime.
Moreover, it could not be said that deprivation of property under the 1996 Act is
simply a marginal erosion of, or minimal interference with, property rights. Yet,
the courts have acceded to the idea that the common good may require the confis-
cation of assets, even where those assets are held by an entirely innocent party.98
In 1991, the Irish Law Reform Commission had rejected the option of a civil
process to confiscate assets absent the requirement of a criminal conviction,
stating:
While a civil procedure of this nature is not without its attractions,
it also presents serious constitutional difficulties. The court would,
in effect, be depriving someone of their property on the basis of
allegations of criminal activity, in respect of which there had been
no conviction or proof. In addition, the procedural safeguards
surrounding a criminal trial leading to confiscation are absent in civil
proceedings. Hence, it might well be held that legislation of this
nature would constitute an ‘unjust attack’ on property rights in
contravention of article 43 of the Constitution.99
While the Irish courts have come to a contrary conclusion, it is clear that the
judiciary have concerned themselves with the form of the legislation rather than
its substance and that this has resulted in traditional distinctions between the
civil and criminal paradigms being further obscured.
A punitive civil sanction?
Under the Proceeds of Crime Act, the State, in the guise of the Criminal Assets
Bureau, is essentially seeking to impose criminal punishment in the civil realm.
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Enhanced procedural protections, inherent in criminal procedure, are thereby
circumvented in the interests of efficiency and expediency.100 The Criminal Assets
Bureau uses its civil and administrative cloak to target the assets of criminals as a
form of law enforcement. In this, the Bureau is permitted to rely on hearsay
evidence,101 establish its case on the balance of probabilities,102 require the
respondent to assist the Bureau’s investigation by way of obligatory disclosure,103
as well as compelling disclosure from third parties, such as solicitors, who have
dealings with the respondent.104 Furthermore, the anonymity of non-Garda
bureau officials might be preserved.105 This might well be described as a middle-
ground system of justice,106 in which punitive civil sanctions are used for
crime-control purposes, neatly sidestepping the ‘obstacles’ that are present in the
criminal process. This, however, raises serious concerns for the rights of the
individual. The Proceeds of Crime Act has nonetheless received the imprimatur of
the Irish courts. If, however, the courts were to recognise the Proceeds of Crime Act
as a middle-ground system in which some (but not all) safeguards of the criminal
process would apply, then the legitimacy of the confiscation of criminal assets
would be strengthened. On the other hand, though, this would, of course, present
its own difficulties—not least in determining what safeguards ought to apply in
such a middle-ground system. The next section considers whether a middle-
ground approach offers an alternative to the conventional civil/criminal
dichotomy (especially whether a heightened standard of proof would be appro-
priate).
A middle-ground system as an alternative?
Middle-ground process refers to any legal process that draws on both civil and
criminal elements. The question that must be asked, though, is whether the State
should be permitted to impose sanctions in a civil setting. If the sanction is
regarded as a criminal one, then the enhanced procedural protections associated
with criminal procedure will apply. Even if the sanction is a civil one, we must
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consider whether special procedural protections ought to be applied where the
sanction is more than compensatory. The purpose of such special procedural
protections is to protect defendants against government over-intrusiveness and
from erroneous imposition of a sanction.107 Middle-ground sanctions would, Mann
contends, allow the criminal law to be ‘invoked only when necessary to maintain a
public threat of severe punishment for those who cause the most harm in the most
blameworthy circumstances’.108 Surely, though, those engaged in such criminal
wrongdoing as armed robbery, drug trafficking, serious fraud, smuggling,
directing prostitution, etc.109 should be dealt with under the criminal law rather
than a hybrid civil/ criminal procedure. While recourse to the more cumbersome
criminal process, with its enhanced procedural protections, might be less
appealing (from a practical point of view) to prosecution authorities, surely this is
the appropriate avenue for dealing with such criminal wrongdoing.
Over the past number of years there has been significant ‘slippage’ between
criminal and civil procedure—recourse to the civil process, for crime-control
purposes, is now being exploited as a means of avoiding the protections of the
criminal process.110 In the wake of civil and/or administrative measures being
deployed for crime-control purposes, criminal law (along with its inherent
safeguards) is arguably playing a less prominent role in dealing with criminal
wrongdoing; as the demarcation between the criminal and civil processes blurs,
the State (in the guise of the Criminal Assets Bureau) increasingly resorts to civil
and administrative methods to target ‘criminals’.111 This poses a number of
concerns in relation to the rights of the individual, in that due process norms are
now being sacrificed to interests of efficiency and expediency. This departure has
been justified on perceived inadequacies of the criminal justice system.112 Yet,
there is a strong argument that the criminal process ought to be more than suffi-
cient to pursue wrongdoers and to hold them to account. Indeed, a number of
people targeted by the Criminal Assets Bureau have been held criminally
accountable for their wrongdoing,113 which would appear to lay waste to the
argument (promulgated in the build-up to the passing of the Proceeds of Crime Act
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113 ‘Gilligan attempt to halt funds seizure adjourned’, Irish Times, 19 October 2004; ‘Cab seizes
600,000 of dealer’s assets’, Irish Times, 9 October 2007.
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and the establishment of the Criminal Assets Bureau) that the criminal process is
inadequate when confronted with certain forms of organised criminal activity. If a
person is to suffer criminal punishment, along with the potential for moral oppro-
brium, then the safeguards of the criminal process ought to apply (or, at the very
least, some of them ought to!). As Robinson notes:
The central point is to see that there is practical value, not just
aesthetic or philosophical value, in maintaining the criminal–civil
distinction and the criminal law’s focus on moral blameworthiness.
What we have in the past taken to be instances of individual injustice
we ought to understand now as injuring all of us, as each such
instance incrementally chips away at the criminal law’s moral credi-
bility and, thus, at its power to protect us.114
Admittedly, though, there might be some merit in recognising a middle-ground
system, drawing on elements from both civil and criminal processes, in which
punitive civil sanctions might be imposed absent some procedural safeguards of
the criminal process. So, for example, while the courts might be concerned with
the imposition of criminal punishment, reliance might be placed on hearsay
evidence. There might also be greater reliance on documentary evidence than one
would expect in conventional criminal proceedings. At the same time, though, it
is axiomatic that certain safeguards (such as the presumption of innocence115 and
the burden of proof being imposed on the State) ought also to apply. One particu-
larly controversial issue is the standard of proof that is to be imposed. Given that
proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act are concerned with criminal
punishment, there is a strong argument that the relevant standard should be that
applicable in criminal procedure. Section 8(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act,
however, provides that the standard of proof is that applicable to civil
proceedings, namely the balance of probabilities.116 The civil standard of proof has
been justified on grounds of difficulties in prosecuting those at the upper
echelons of organised crime.117 As Deputy O’Donoghue stated, in the build-up to
the passing of the Proceeds of Crime Act in 1996, the Bill was ‘specifically directed
at the criminal gangs which have become bloated on the profits of drug dealing
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115 The UK Supreme Court came to a contrary conclusion in Gale v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011]
UKSC 49, holding that the presumption of innocence does not apply to non-conviction-based
asset forfeiture proceedings.
116 Banco Ambrosiano SPA v Ansbacher & Co. Ltd [1987] ILRM 669; Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [1993]
ILRM 145. The UK Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Gale v Serious Organised Crime
Agency [2011] UKSC 49.
117 Dáil Éireann, Private Members’ Business—Organised Crime (Restraint and Disposal of Illicit
Assets) Bill 1996, Second Stage, 2 July 1996, vol. 467, col. 2463, per Deputy E. Byrne.
 at University of Sussex Library on February 11, 2015epj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
and the proceeds of audacious robberies. It permits the Garda Síochána, which is
frequently unable to gather admissible conventional evidence against criminal
godfathers, to strike at the heart of their criminal empires’.118 As such, the lower
civil standard of proof was considered appropriate in eliminating the financial
incentives of crime and confiscating the proceeds of crime.
Given the implications of an order under the Act, however, a case might be
advanced in favour of a higher standard of proof than a bare balance of probabil-
ities.119 For example, in civil proceedings concerning allegations of criminal
wrongdoing the courts might insist on a higher standard than would be the case
in proceedings concerning negligence. In such circumstances, a court, according
to Denning LJ, ‘does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is
considering a charge of a criminal nature; but still it does require a degree of
probability which is commensurate with the occasion’.120 The Irish Supreme Court
has recognised that ‘the more serious the allegation made in civil proceedings,
then the more astute must the judge be to find that the allegation in question has
been proved’.121 It has also been said that the civil standard of proof—the balance of
probabilities—is ‘a standard which takes into account the nature and gravity of the
issue to be investigated and decided’.122
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Assets) Bill 1996, Second Stage, 2 July 1996, vol. 467, col. 2411.
119 Bater v Bater [1951–52] P 35; Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247. Cf. R. Pattenden, ‘The
Risk of Non-persuasion in Civil Trials: The Case Against a Floating Standard of Proof’ (1988) 7 CJQ
220; M. Redmayne, ‘Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1999) 62(2) MLR 167.
120 Bater v Bater [1951–52] P 35 at 37. Similar sentiments were again expressed by Denning LJ in Hornal
v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247 at 258. See also the decision of Lord Scarman in R v Home
Secretary, ex p. Khawaja [1984] 1 AC 74 at 112–14 which was cited with approval by Hamilton CJ in
Georgopoulus v Beaumont Hospital Board [1998] 3 IR 132. But see the dissenting judgments delivered
by Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Lloyd of Berwick in Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of
Proof) [1996] AC 563.
121 O’Keeffe v Ferris [1997] 2 ILRM 161 at 168. In Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [1993] ILRM 145 at 183,
there were allegations of anti-competitive practices, which carried potential liability of fines and
other penalties. Keane J commented:
‘These are civil proceedings and it follows that the applicable standard of proof is that appro-
priate to such cases, ie, proof on the balance of probabilities. It may well be that that standard
should be applied with some degree of flexibility and that the courts should require allegations
of particular gravity to be clearly established in evidence. But the Supreme Court have made it
clear in Banco Ambrosiano v Ansbacher [1987] ILRM 669 that this does not mean that a different
standard of proof is to be applied when, for example, an allegation of fraud is being made. I am,
accordingly, satisfied that I should apply in these actions the standard of proof normally appli-
cable in civil proceedings, ie, proof on the balance of probabilities.’
122 Georgopoulus v Beaumont Hospital Board [1998] 3 IR 132 at 149–50. Concern might be expressed,
however, in relation to vagueness and uncertainty. Cf. Banco Ambrosiano SPA v Ansbacher & Co. Ltd
[1987] ILRM 669 at 701.
 at University of Sussex Library on February 11, 2015epj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Given the nature of proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act, there is a strong
argument in favour of insisting upon a more rigorous ‘civil’ standard of proof, one
that might well be virtually indistinguishable from that in criminal proceedings.
This can be illustrated in B v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary,
concerning a sex offender order, where Lord Bingham stated that there may be
times when the civil standard of proof ‘will for all practical purposes be indistin-
guishable from the criminal standard’.123 Similarly, in Gough v Chief Constable of the
Derbyshire Constabulary, concerning football banning orders, it was said that the
civil standard of proof ‘is flexible and must reflect the consequences that will
follow if the case for a banning order is made out. This should lead the justices to
apply an exacting standard of proof that will, in practice, be hard to distinguish
from the criminal standard’.124 In McCann,125 a case concerning anti-social
behaviour orders, Lord Steyn stated ‘in my view pragmatism dictates that the task
of magistrates should be made more straightforward by ruling that they must in
all cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard’.126 Similarly, Lord Hope of
Craighead, in holding that the appropriate standard in proceedings for an ASBO
was the criminal standard, stated:
But it is not an invariable rule that the lower standard of proof must
be applied in civil proceedings. I think that there are good reasons, in
the interests of fairness, for applying the higher standard when
allegations are made of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct which, if
proved, would have serious consequences for the person against
whom they are made.127
If the Irish courts were to adopt a similar approach to that in McCann, and insist
upon the criminal standard of proof in proceedings concerning the confiscation of
assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act, this would go a long way towards
respecting the rights of the individual.128 Were there a requirement that property
could only be confiscated where it is shown, beyond reasonable doubt, that that
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124 [2002] QB 1213 at 1242–3.
125 R (on the application of McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester; Clingham v Chelsea Royal London Borough
Council [2003] 1 AC 787.
126 [2003] 1 AC 787 at 812.
127 Ibid. at 826.
128 Such an approach has, however, been rejected by the UK courts. See, e.g., Serious Organised Crime
Agency v Gale [2009] EWHC 1015 (QB) at [9]; R (on the application of Director of the Assets Recovery Agency)
v He and Chen [2004] EWHC 3021 (Admin) at [50]. The UK legislation explicitly states that the
standard of proof to be applied is the balance of probabilities (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s.
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(Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, s. 8(2)).
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property constitutes proceeds of crime then the infliction of criminal punishment
in a middle-ground system in which some (but not all) criminal law safeguards are
present would be much less objectionable.
Conclusion
Conventional understanding distinguishes between civil and criminal paradigms.
In recent years, a new tool of law enforcement—non-conviction-based asset
forfeiture—has emerged to tackle certain forms of criminal activity, particularly
organised crime. The non-conviction-based approach does not, however, neatly fit
into the conventional civil/criminal dichotomy. Rather, it represents a hybrid
process in which criminal law objectives are pursued in the civil process. And,
given that non-conviction-based asset forfeiture operates outside the realm of the
criminal process, enhanced procedural protections that are mandated in criminal
procedure are conveniently sidelined, which makes the non-conviction-based
approach particularly appealing for police and prosecution agencies. This
approach does, however, give rise to a number of issues surrounding the
diminution of the rights of the individual in favour of concern for efficiency and
expediency. Given executive enthusiasm in this respect, it is left to the courts to
ensure that criminal punishment is not imposed absent necessary procedural
safeguards. Regrettably, though, the courts have come up short in this regard and
have acceded, all too easily, to the executive classification of proceedings under
the Proceeds of Crime Act as ‘civil’. Commenting on US jurisprudence, Fellmeth
states, ‘In deferring to legislative intent in extremis, the Supreme Court has effec-
tively undermined constitutional restrictions on criminal punishment, allowing
the legislature to circumvent these restrictions through nothing more than an
advantageous choice of words’.129 Although domestic courts have proven to be
willing to accept the ‘civil’ label attached to non-conviction-based asset forfeiture
proceedings, this is not the final say on the matter, however. Non-conviction-based
asset forfeiture is expected to come before the European Court of Human Rights in
the not-too-distant future,130 which will further enlighten discussion of this
powerful new tool in the armoury of the State.
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130 In Ireland, it has long been anticipated that the decision in Gilligan v CAB [1998] 3 IR 185 (HC),
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